A Medical Career-Choice After 2012: Intern/ Resident/Fellow/Attending. The Semmelweis Society.

Dr. Blake Moore, FACS
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Amy Sorrel
AMA News
6 November 2009
Dear Ms. Sorrel;
 
A famous aphorism is that "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". The medical world's corollary is that "One hospital administrator's disruptive physician is another man's patient advocate".
 
As President of SSI, I help represent the interest's of physicians who have been targeted for retribution for most commonly protecting our patients. Dr. Butler as a former president of and founder of SSI has worked tirelessly to protect physicians so victimized. He put you in contact with Dr. Colantonio who has been suspended for questioning the actions of an untrained and unsupervised physician extender who misplaced a tube thoracostomy ultimately killing a patient. I had my hospital privileges suspended after reporting the deaths of multiple patients to the State of SC at the hands of a "mercy killer" nurse. My surgical career has been interrupted for the great and radical offense of advocating as a physician the radical concept that as a doctor "thou shalt not kill" is a reasonable concept. These actions which at times stand in the way of corporate profit can result in the end of a doctor's medical career by being labeled as "DISRUPTIVE". It is inherently wrong, but it remains standard operating procedure in Board Rooms across America. 
 
We may all agree that people who are deranged, abusive, unprofessional or serially antisocial may in fact be "disruptive", but the current state of affairs that without due process and with near absolute civil immunity, allows one businessman to arbitrarily and capriciously label another businessman as "disruptive" and with impunity to destroy the second business based upon mere allegations without proof is unfair, unjust, and un-American. It is also the law of the land. At any time a hospital CEO can with impunity utter the phrase "disruptive physician" and blackball any doctor who might stand in the way of corporate profit, such that once so listed and placed on the National Practitioner Data Bank, that physician is unlikely to ever practice their career again. Henry Waxman's dirty little law known as HCQIA is so utilized to exploit physicians and engage in serial mafioso-like quasi-extortion measures to keep doctors in line and create a functional state of terror where any doctor who would dare have the audacity to speak up for their patient, and against corporate profit, does so at great personal risk. This is medicine's ultimate dirty little secret-but again one man's "disruptive physician" is another man's "patient-advocate".
 
Please call if you would like to discuss further.
 
Sincerely,
 
BLAKE HARRISON MOORE, MD FACS CIME
President Semmelweis Society International
ph-803-749-7497; c-803-447-4565

Dr.  Moore's Statement
 
  Annexed is the filing of Motion for Writ of Cert to the US Supreme Court in this case. The issue in the attendant matter concerns retaliatory actions by a hospital where I reported frank misconduct whereby 2 nurses engaged in actions directly leading to deaths of patients. The state nursing board suspended the licenses of the 2 nurses, but the hospital kept them employed despite obvious efforts to conceal deaths.  In response the hospital went to extreme measures to retaliate. Ultimately this led to false charges of child abuse (made by the hospital, then withdrawn by same. However, in a slick move the hospital's counsel took the false allegations that were made by the hospital, obtained the confidential protected file and released to themselves the false charges made by themselves to themselves, and used this as pretext to remove the whistleblower from the staff.  In a Kafka-esque perversion this became, "We're accusing you of being a deviant, we acknowledge that you are not and that this is a false charge, but we're firing you because you were accused (by us)".
 
  To date the US Federal Court has upheld that it is now okay and an immunized act for the hospital to readily commit a criminal act in forwarding their nefarious machinations. We object on constitutional grounds that:
 
 1) A victim of a crime deserves the right to seek redress for the crime in which they have been victimized;, and,
 
 2) clearly Bad Faith machinations should not be immunized--and how can committing a crime ever be considered a "good faith" effort to forward quality of care (in preparation). 

Dr. Moore's Statement

Annexed is the filing of Motion for Writ of Cert to the US Supreme Court in this case. The issue in the attendant matter concerns retaliatory actions by a hospital where I reported frank misconduct where by 2 nurses engaged in actions directly leading to deaths of patients. The state nursing board suspended the licenses of the 2 nurses, but the hospital kept them employed despite obvious efforts to conceal deaths. In response the hospital went to extreme measures to retaliate. Ultimately this led to false charges of child abuse (made by the hospital, then withdrawn by same. However, in a slick move the hospitals counsel took the false allegations that were made by the hospital, obtained the confidential protected file and released to themselves the false charges made by themselves to themselves, and used this as pretext to remove the whistleblower from the staff. In a Kafka-esque perversion this became "were accusing you of being a deviant, we acknowledge that you are not and that this is a false charge, but were firing you because you were accused (by us)". To date the US Federal Court has upheld that it is now okay and an immunized act for the hospital to readily commit a criminal act in forwarding their nefarious machinations. We object on constitutional grounds that 1) A victim of a crime deserves the right to seek redress for the crime in which they have been victimized, and 2) clearly Bad Faith machinations should not be immunized--and how can commiting a crime ever be considered a "good faith" effort to forward quality of care.(in preparation) 

Click to "The Yankee Doctor."

questionS presented

 

I.                Whether the Hospital’s action against Dr. Moore was properly a “professional review action” as contemplated by HCQIA so as to invoke consideration of that statute’s qualified immunity for the Respondents.

 

II.             Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Respondents based upon the qualified immunity conferred by HCQIA, at 42 U.S.C. § 11111 and its provisions to qualify for same at § 11112(a).

 

III.          Whether the Hospital, against which the Petitioner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was brought, is a state actor under applicable law such that the trial court erred in dismissing that claim in lieu of granting his Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on said claim.

 

IV.           Whether the Petitioner’s state law claims fail on the merits.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rule 14.1(b) statement

 

A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

 

          Plaintiffs-Appellants and Petitioners: Blake H. Moore, MD and Kingstree Surgical Associates, LLC.

 

          Defendants-Appellees and Respondents: Williamsburg Regional Hospital, John Hales, Breton Juberg, MD, Raymond Allen, MD, Evelyn Ansa, MD, Joel Bonaparte, MD, Bernadette Bonaparte, MD, Kenneth Johnson, MD, Steve Corey, DPM, Michelle Corey-Butterworth, DPM, Kevin Springle, MD, and Gilbertas Rimkus, MD, jointly and severally.

 

 

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF PETITIONER

 

Pursuant to Sup.Ct. R. 29.6, Kingstree Surgical Associates, LLC has no parent or publicly held company owning 10% or more of the corporation’s stock.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

table of contents

 

Questions Presented ........................................... i

Rule 14.1(b) Statement........................................ ii

Table of Contents................................................ iii

Table of Authorities............................................ iv

Opinions Below.................................................... 1

Jurisdiction.......................................................... 1

Statutory Provisions Involved............................. 2

Statement Of The Case....................................... 2

Reasons for Granting the Petition....................... 6

I.      The Fourth Circuit’s Holding that the

        Hospital’s Actions were Properly a HCQIA

        Professional Review Action, Invoking

        Consideration of Qualified Immunity for the

        Respondents, Sets a Perilous Standard for

        Physicians Requiring Clarification and

        Reversal....................................................... 6

 

II.    The Fourth Circuit Wrongly Affirmed

        Summary Judgment to the Respondents

        Based Upon HCQIA’s Qualified Immunity at

        42 U.S.C. § 11111(a) and its Provisions to

        Qualify for Same at § 11112(a).................. 13

 

        A.  Petitioner’s Privileges Were Suspended In

             the Absence of Any Reasonable Belief That  

             Said Suspension Was in the Furtherance of

             Quality Healthcare.  Allegations Are Not

             Fact....................................................... 14

 

        B.  Respondents Failed to Make A   Reasonable

   Effort to Ascertain the Facts in the

   Matter; Rather They  Recklessly Ignored

   the Evidence......................................... 16

 

C.  Respondents Failure to Provide Adequate

     Hearing Procedures Violated the

     Applicable Medical Staff Bylaws........... 17

 

D.  Respondents’ Actions Against Petitioner

     Were Not Taken in the Reasonable Belief

     That They Were Warranted by the

     Facts..................................................... 18

 

E.  HCQIA Should Not Be Utilized As An

     Immunity Shield to Foster Violation of

     State Law By A Hospital....................... 19

 

III. The Hospital is a State Actor under Applicable     

 Law such that the Fourth Circuit Erred in   

 Affirming the District Court’s Dismissal of   

       Petitioner’s § 1983 Claim in lieu of Granting

       His Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on

      Same............................................................ 20

 

     A.  The Hospital Meets the Definition of a

          Public Hospital  and State Actor Under  

    Established Legal Precedent................... 21

 

     B.  The Hospital, as a Health Service District,

          Exists Only By Virtue of   South Carolina                       State Law.  It is Therefore a State Actor.................................. 24

 

     C.  The Hospital’s Attorney Admitted It Was

 A Public Hospital in 2004........................ 25

 

     D.  The Hospital’s Board Chairman and Other

          Physicians Opined That It Was a Public and        

          County Hospital...................................... 26

 

     E.  The Hospital For Purposes of The Medicaid

          Disproportionate Share Program Asserted It

          Was A Public Hospital, Receiving Cost   

                            Reconciliation From the SDHHS   

                                      Commensurate Therewith          26

 

     F.  Fundamental Principles of Equitable

          Estoppel Should Prevent The Hospital from

          Choosing When to be Public Versus

          Private..................................................... 28

 

     G.  The Hospital Denied Petitioner

          Fundamental Due Process and Equal

          Protection Rights Under the Fourteenth

          Amendment.  It Knew of These Well-

          Recognized Constitutional Rights and

          Should Have Been Held Accountable..... 29

 

IV. Petitioner’s State Law Claims Do Not

      Necessarily Fail on the Merits..................... 31

 

Conclusion......................................................... 47

Appendix

Appendix A

Fourth Circuit Opinion, March 12, 2009..... 1a

 

Appendix B

District Court Memorandum Opinion and

Order, September 21, 2007........................ 34a

 

Appendix C

Denial of Petition for Rehearing and

Rehearing En Banc, April 7, 2009.............. 73a

 

Supplemental Appendix

 

Supplemental Appendix D

NPDB Guidebook, “Reporting Adverse Clinical

Privileges Actions” pp. E-17-E-21............. 75sa

 

 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

 

Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr.,

544 N.E.2d 733, 739 (Ill.1989)......................... 23

 

Alpert v. Bd. of Governors, 145 N.Y.S.2d 534,

537-39 (N.Y. App. Div. 955)............................. 23

 

Anbar v. Leahan, 1998 WL 314691 (E.D.Pa.1998) (unreported) 35, 36

 

Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728

(9th Cir.1992).................................................... 15

 

Baker v. Chavis, 306 S.C. 203, 410 S.E.2d 600,

603 (Ct. App. 1991).......................................... 41

 

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438,

122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002)............ 10

 

Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 2777 (1982)  25

 

Brader v. Allegheny General Hosp., 64 F.3d 869

(3rd Cir. 1995)................................................... 17

 

Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Services, 101

F.3d 1324 (10th Cir.1996),  cert. denied 117 S.Ct. 1461, 520 U.S. 1181, 137 L.Ed.2d 564................................................ 16, 36

 

Burdge v. Greenville Hospital System, 318 S.C.

312, 457 S.E.2d 610 (1995)........................ 21, 22

 

Campbell v. St. Mary's Hosp., 252 N.W.2d 581,

585 (Minn.1977)............................................... 22

 

Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051,

2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766(1980)............................. 11

 

DeBondt v. Carlton Motorcars, Inc., 342 S.C. 254, 269, 536 S.E.2d 399, 407 (Ct. App. 2000)  41

 

Edson v. Griffin Hospital, 21 Conn.Sup. 55,

144 A.2d 341, 344 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958).... 21

 

Findlay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 230 P.2d 526, 530 (Ariz. 1951)   23

 

Folkens v. Hunt, 290 S.C. 194, 348 S.E.2d 839

(Ct. App. 1986)................................................. 32

 

Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. at 162, 276 S.E.2d at 778 (1981) 32

 

Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc.,

313 F.3d 205 (4thCir.2002)............................... 12

 

Fuller v. Eastern Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,

240 S.C.75, 124 S.E.2d 602, 610 (1962).......... 39

 

Gordon v. Lewistown Hospital, 423 F.3d 184,

201 (3d Cir.2005)............................................... 9

 

Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492, 79 S.Ct.

1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959)............................ 23

 

Greenville Pub. Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc,

496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1974)....................... 45, 46

 

Hamilton County Hosp. v. Andrews,

84 N.E.2d 469, 471 (Ind. 1949)........................ 23

 

Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414,

416-17 (1927)................................................... 22

 

Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs. of Greenville, P.A.,

330 S.C. 92, 498 S.E.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1998)... 45

 

Henderson v. City of Knoxville, 9 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tenn. 1928)......... 23

 

Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp.,

181 F.3d 59 (4th Cir.1999).............................. 11

 

Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 158 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Ky. 1942).... 21

 

In Re Zaman, 285 S.C. 345, 329 S.E.2d 436 (S.C.1985)................ 17, 19, 20

 

Islami v. Covenant Medical Center, Inc.,

822 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D.Iowa 1992)................. 14

 

Janasik v. Fairway Oaks Villas Horizontal Property Regime, 307 S.C. 339, 415 S.E.2d 384 (1992)...................................... 29

 

Johnson v. City of Ripon, 47 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Wis.1951)......................... 23

 

Johnson v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co.,

94 F. Supp 959 (D.S.C.1951)........................... 35

 

Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Association of St. Louis, 523 F.2d 56 (8th Cir.1975).......................................................... 31

 

Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Associates, 342 S.C. 579, 538 S.E.2d 15 (Ct. App. 2000)................................................................... 43, 44

 

Levin v. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 46 A.2d 298, 300 (Md. 1946)                                 21

 

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)......................... 30

 

McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Sys., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996)....... 44

 

Modaber v. Culpepper Mem. Hosp., Inc, 674 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir.1982) 22

 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)......................................................................... 30

 

Newton v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 282 P. 1068, 1070 (Colo. 1929)................. 22

 

Noack Enterprises, Inc. v. Country Corner, 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1986) 42

 

Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696

(4th Cir.1991).............................................. 45, 46

 

Owens v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 643 A.2d 233 (Conn.1994)............ 23

 

Ritter v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 637 P.2d 940, 944-45 (Wash.1981).............. 22

 

 

Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Ctr, 222 F. Supp.

59, 61 (D.D.C. 1963)........................................ 21

 

Smith v. Williams, 141 S.C. 265, 139 S.E. 625 (1927)     29

 

Sosa v. Bd. of Managers, 437 F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1971)     22

 

Todd v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.,

283 S.C. 155, 321 S.E.2d 602 (Ct.App.1984)................... 32

 

Todd v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mutual. Insurance. Co.,

276 S.C. 284, 278 S.E.2d 607 (1981)............... 46

 

Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976)............................................................... 29

 

Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 205 N.Y.S. 554, 555-56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1924), aff'd, 147 N.E. 219

(N.Y.1925)…………………………………………… 20

 

Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Services, 127 N.C. App. 71, 488 S.E.2d 284 (1997)..................................................................................................... 38, 40

 

Ware v. Benedikt, 280 S.W.2d 234, 236

(Ark. 1955)....................................................... 23

 

Westminster Investing Corp. v. Lamps Unlimited, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 316, 317 (Va.1989).......................................................... 39

 

Wuchenich v. Shenandoah Memorial Hospital, 215 F.3d 1324 (4th Cir. 2000) (unreported)..................................................... 39

 

Yashon v. Hunt, 825 F.2d 1016, 1022 (6th Cir. 1987)............................... 22

 

 

 

 

Statutes and Rules

 

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution............ 20, 23, 29, 31

 

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)............................................ 1

 

28 U.S.C. § 2101(c)............................................ 1

 

42 U.S.C. § 1983.................... 2, 6, 20, 21, 29, 32

 

42 U.S.C. § 11101 et seq................................... 2

 

42 U.S.C. § 11101............................................ 10

 

42 U.S.C. § 11111(a).................................... 9, 13

 

42 U.S.C. §11112(a)......................... 9, 10, 13, 32

 

42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(4).................................... 18

 

42 U.S.C. § 11112(b)(3).................................... 39

 

42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1)(A)................................ 18

 

42 U.S.C. § 11137(c)........................................ 36

 

42 U.S.C. § 11151(9).................................. 2, 6, 7

 

42 U.S.C. § 11151(9)(E)................................ 8, 10

 

45 C.F.R. § 60.3........................................... 8, 35

 

Fed. R. App. Proc. 41(d)(1)................................. 1

 

Sup. Ct. Rule 13.1............................................. 1

 

S.C. Code § 4-9-82........................................... 25

 

S.C. Code § 20-7-690............................. 9, 16, 19

 

S.C. Code § 30-71-20................................................................................. 43

 

S.C. Code Ann. § 33-56-180(a)........................ 45

 

S.C. Code § 39-5-20......................................................... 40

 

S.C. Code § 39-5-140....................................................... 43

 

S.C. Code § 40-71-10................................................................................. 43

 

S.C.Code § 44-7-2130...................................... 24

 

Law Review Articles

 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 Colum.L.Rev. 42.

63-64 (1982).................................................................... 33

 

Miscellaneous

 

H.R.Rep. 99-903, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384.. 9, 11

 

NPDB Guidebook........................................... 3, 8

 

Second Restatement of Torts, Section 46

(Supp.1948)...................................................... 33

 

Title XIX IGT’s at National Conference of State Legislatures at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/

health/forum/cot/strat3.htm......................... 27

 

William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 4195 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1992)................................................................... 37

 

WRH Medical Staff Bylaws, Article VII,

§ 2.............................................................................. 17, 40

 

WRH Medical Staff Bylaws, Article VIII,

§ 4(a)................................................................................ 38